INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, European policymakers and academics are once again concerned with designing a regulatory framework that protects investors from misbehavior by self-interested managers and controlling shareholders. To be sure, no company ever survived by ignoring the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, customers and suppliers. The academic and policy debate, however, focuses generally on the principal-agent relationship between those with actual control of the firm and outside investors. This is hardly surprising given the importance attributed to the idea that greater effectiveness of common law legal systems in regulating agency relationships, compared to their civil law (and mostly European) counterparts, explains the success of Anglo-American capital markets. ' seem to believe that a more regulatory approach in the area of corporate governance will only enhance the accountability of directors, managers and controlling shareholders. Their efforts are based on the assumption that these parties will better serve the interest of passive investors if they embrace rules and regulations that offer them clear guidance about the best way in which to discharge their duties to investors and other stakeholders. To this effect, the argument that corporate governance rules can clarify and supplement these duties has often been used to support the idea that firms do not really bear high costs from reform measures in this area.
Opponents of the regulatory view, who believe that corporate governance should not be considered as a goal in itself, but rather as a tool to improve firm performance, argue that corporate governance initiatives are far too overreaching. 5 In fact, the current reform movement has spawned many cumbersome rules that do not seem to prevent corporate failures and, more importantly, appear to have a relatively small effect on investment decisions. 6 Unchecked, this development could jeopardize entrepreneurship, innovation and longterm economic growth. 7 For instance, corporate governance regulations have induced small firms to rethink their stock exchange listing. 8 In this respect, corporate governance rules and regulations act as an entry barrier for high-potential companies. More troubling still is the notion that stringent corporate governance rules and the stiff penalties for top For a particularly interesting take on how the recent overreaching corporate governance reforms tend to erode the competitiveness of US capital executives make start-up companies reluctant to use an initial public offering (IPO) as a financing vehicle and arguably hamper the performance and development of listed firms. Strict rules and regulations encourage managers to seek high return on investment and shareholder value, which eventually could lead to short-termism in the boardroom and the adoption of an adversarial management style. 9 Aside from these problems, corporate governance reforms can also bring significant confusion to the market. Managers or controlling parties could, for instance, adopt corporate governance measures to conceal underperformance, thereby deceiving investors. According to the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ), a rating system provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. outperformed its peers by 87 percent.'o Its CGQ was better than 42 percent of the S&P 500 just a few days before its collapse.'' Of course, advocates of more detailed regulation see the Lehman case as just another example of why there is a need for policymakers and lawmakers to develop more effective measures that prevent opportunistic behavior in the corporate setting. However, the case could also be made that Lehman merely demonstrates that there is no clearcut correlation between a "good" governance system on paper and firm performance in practice. More detailed regulation, which arguably encourages box-ticking and places more emphasis on the compliance process, would only widen the gap between corporate governance on paper and in practice.
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detrimental to the operation and development of listed companies.
12
The answers to these questions will most likely affect the current reviews of corporate governance initiatives concerning listed firms.
1 3
Despite awareness of the need to reign in misconduct, the media attention regarding corporate scandals arguably discourages policymakers from undertaking a deep enough study concerning the effectiveness of new corporate governance initiatives. The case has never been stronger for policymakers to rethink corporate governance mechanisms and analyze the effect of the reforms undertaken over the past decade. The goal of this paper is to understand the organizational needs of listed companies and assess arguments for and against the introduction of stricter corporate governance measures for publicly held firms. Moreover, it suggests a legal framework that can have a positive impact on firm performance and development.
In addressing which legal framework can enhance good governance and improve the performance of listed companies across the board, this paper distinguishes between different strands of reform arising worldwide and addresses problems with the one-size-fits-all approach. Section Two looks at the effect of takeover regulation in the European Union (EU). It argues that although the market for corporate control aligns the interests of managers and investors, a one-size-fits-all approach may be inappropriate for most listed companies. In Section Three, we canvass recent trends in corporate governance discussions. Our analysis shows that the new wave of reforms can have a detrimental effect on the innovative and entrepreneurial initiatives that spur economic growth and job creation in a global context. Indeed, the exemplars in Section Four show that corporate governance reforms are often misguided and ill-informed. Section Five identifies alternative legal mechanisms that could be employed by policymakers, lawmakers, as well as courts in solving corporate governance problems in listed companies and enhancing firm performance. Section Six concludes. One of the most debated issues of the past decade involves the mandatory enforcement of the 'one-share-one-vote' rule.
A
14 Under this rule, a listed company must grant its shareholders an equal measure of voting and cash flow rights. One-share-one-vote is commonly enforced through limitations on the issuance of different classes of shares, such as multiple voting shares, non-voting preferred stock, and similar specimens. This restriction can take the form of absolute bans on dualclass structures or, as is still the case in many countries, limits on the percentage of shares with asymmetrical voting rights that can be issued by a listed firm.'
5 The ultimate purpose of the one-share-one-vote rule is (1) to reduce the incentives of controlling parties to expropriate minority investors and (2) to stimulate the emergence of a market for corporate control. One-share-one-vote seems to provide a simple and effective way to accomplish these goals, making it the preferred recipe of policymakers in both developed and emerging countries.' whether these other schemes are being used to circumvent one-shareone-vote, this rule is usually unenforceable in practice.
In the context of takeovers in Europe, one-share-one-vote is partially responsible for the creation of the breakthrough rule included in the EU Takeover Bids Directive.' 8 The breakthrough rule endorses the view that an offeror, upon the acquisition of 75% of the outstanding share capital, can convene a general meeting of shareholders at short notice with the purpose of eliminating any pre-bid defenses deployed by the target firm. In this respect, the breakthrough rule imposes a oneshare-one-vote approach in offeree companies, which has been deemed necessary to create a level playing field for takeover bids.1 9 In addition, the Takeover Bids Directive also introduced the board neutrality rule to create space for a European market for corporate control. Under this rule, the management board of a target firm cannot thwart a successful takeover bid by adopting post-bid defensive measures, such as poison pills or issuing multiple voting shares to white knights, without the approval from the general meeting of shareholders. 20 The breakthrough and board neutrality rules attempt to prevent opportunistic behavior by the parties in control of a listed firm. The board neutrality and breakthrough rules sparked much controversy among EU member states. For example, in the United Kingdom one-share-one-vote is more accepted than in Sweden, where it is common for companies to issue shares that carry multiple voting rights. 22 In order to strike a balance between views as opposite as these, EU lawmakers adopted opt-in and opt-out provisions that allow 21 Id. The Takeover Bids Directive also contains other rules that are designed to protect minority shareholders against opportunism on the part of the offeror: (1) a mandatory bid rule that ensures that an offeror cannot obtain a controlling stake without making a controlling bid; (2) disclosure rules according to which the offeror must announce his intention to make an offer and make public an offer document containing at least a minimum of information; and (3) 'squeeze-out' and 'sell-out' rules that would have to be implemented at a fair price. August 2010 , Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung, Band 2, De Gruyter, (2010 
12.28
The implementation and discussion of the provisions of the Takeover Directive has strengthened shareholder rights and enforced checks and balances within listed companies. Still, the Directive has not yet sparked an active market for corporate control capable of preventing misbehavior by managers and controlling parties. This has prompted policymakers to embark on an even more ambitious agenda: "strengthening" corporate governance frameworks. Under this strategy, the refinement of transparency and investor protection rules is prescribed to regulate relations between principals and agents. These measures ultimately seek to promote long-term business success and enhance investor confidence. In the next section, we evaluate and compare the corporate governance frameworks that were introduced to solve conflicts between controlling shareholders, managers, investors and other stakeholders. We also provide an update of recent trends and prospects in the fast-changing area of corporate governance. Table I shows the popularity of the Directive's opt out provisions. Member states that imposed the board neutrality had already adopted a similar rule at national level. Most member states were not familiar with the breakthrough rule, which explains its unpopularity.
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II. WHAT Do CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS TELL US?
A. WHY CARE ABOUT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
The past years have seen unparalleled change in corporate governance practices worldwide. Several finance scandals in the beginning of this century provided new momentum for introducing important legal and regulatory reforms. The scandals were not only instrumental in moving corporate governance up the policy agenda, but also in making it an integral part of the daily decision-making process of listed firms. Corporate governance reforms emerging in the aftermath of these scandals slowly settled in the global business environment creating a new set of minimum governance standards. Although the corporate governance movement necessarily raised firm's awareness of the decision-making process and internal control mechanisms, it never evolved much more beyond an exercise in "boxticking."
Consequently, when analyzing different corporate governance approaches, it is necessary to be aware that underperforming companies may have a financial incentive to mislead the market by focusing on good governance instead of growth, performance and innovation. This is best illustrated by the use of "precatory signals" that can deceive investors into believing that the insiders of a firm are willing to restrain their diversionary activities. Precatory signals are those that are not tied to effective commitments to reduce expropriation by managers or controlling parties. 30 In many cases, firms that adopt corporate governance codes and measures of best practice ostensibly restrict the opportunistic activities of controlling parties. Whilst the controlling parties in listed firms will not bear significant costs by following standard corporate governance arrangements, there may be considerable financial rewards in their adoption if investors are willing to pay a premium for shares of allegedly "well-govemed" companies.
The U.S. automotive industry provides an example of deceiving appearances.' While General Motor's (GM) corporate governance (2010) .
35 Problems and successes in the automotive industry are often linked to corporate governance issues. For example, Toyota's safety crisis is largely attributed to corporate governance failures. It's assumed that its traditional board, which is large and hierarchical, would not be able to deal adequately with internal and external changes. Surprisingly, however, its position as a global market leader could be overtaken by Volkswagen, which was recently involved in one of the biggest German corruption scandals ever. The scandals have not initiated change in the governance structure of Volkswagen. It remains to be managed by a cozy network of workers, politicians and executives (despite increasing criticism corporate governance proponents 39 The emergence of electronic proxy and voting platforms provided necessary impetus to solve complex and cumbersome voting procedures. 40 Proxy services firms assist listed multinationals in communicating with shareholders by distributing electronic proxy agendas to institutional investors and collecting and processing votes for the annual general meeting of shareholders. Activist investors, such as hedge funds, have increasingly engaged portfolio companies directly to demand changes or improvements in the governance structure of a firm.
4 1 These active investors often contact a portfolio company's management to seek financial information or to influence decision-making and disclosure. This increased level of involvement can lead to by mergers and reorganizations, increased leverage, dividend recapitalizations, and the replacement of management and board members. Activism by hedge funds has even been regarded as the driving force behind the next corporate governance revolution. Yet, even though activist shareholders have the potential to impose discipline on boards and managers, these equity funds are mostly shrouded in mystery, obscurity and complexity. In addition, these funds are said to neglect long-term goals and pursuing short-term pay-offs. 42 There now seems to be some consensus among policymakers about the need for responsible long-term investors instead of short-term activists. Institutional investors and large shareholders are under a growing pressure from'official agencies and other networks, such as the Financial Reporting Council in the United 39 See Section IV.B for a more detailed discussion on the behavior of shareholders during the general meeting.
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Kingdom and the International Corporate Governance Network, to become actively engaged in their portfolio companies.
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The above discussion offers a brief glimpse of some past trends in corporate governance. The picture that emerges is one of ambivalence. Policymakers and lawmakers introduced "sensible" rules and best practices that, with the possible exception of minimum standards geared towards improving business performance, may sometimes have lead to unexpected results. On the one hand, companies may adopt a corporate governance framework that leads them astray because they (and their advisors) are merely engaged in box-ticking to satisfy auditors, analysts, and other financial market watchdogs. On the other hand, companies can opportunistically adhere to "high standards" of governance to signal trustworthiness to the market without a concurrent internal commitment toward improving value. The bottom line, in our view, is that introducing more detailed corporate governance regulation on a one-size-fits-all and ad-hoc basis is less desirable than a flexible principle-based framework. Stricter rules and less flexibility arguably result in higher compliance costs and more box-ticking. Moreover, without empirical research it is hard to predict whether imposing more detailed rules on firms will prevent fraud, let alone an economic downturn. Section IV contains several exemplars to illustrate that the introduction of stricter corporate governance regulation, based mostly on intuitive hunches, can have a negative spill-over effect on the performance and development of firms. Since companies have different corporate governance needs depending on the culture and other firm-specific features such as size, scope, and firm-ownership, it is difficult to make a case for the introduction of more generally defined corporate governance rules.44 This can be seen in the most recent trend in corporate governance, as explained below. The corporate governance framework of listed companies is drawn, roughly, from three different sources. The primary source is corporate law; the second, securities regulation; and the third is codes of best practice and guidelines. 45 This framework is concerned with similar issues across jurisdictions: (1) an active and fair protection of the rights of all shareholders, (2) an accountable management board and effective monitoring mechanisms, and (3) transparent information about the financial and non-financial position of the firm.
46
In the United States, each state has its own corporate law governing the companies that incorporate in that state. 41 Most listed companies incorporate in Delaware due to the modern, flexible and effective nature of its legal framework. 4 8 Delaware General Corporation Law grants shareholders a say on the most important corporate matters, such as significant mergers and acquisitions, amending the articles of association, and electing directors. Since a significant part of Delaware's corporate law mainly consists of default rules, firms are given latitude to establish specific corporate governance features in their articles or by-laws, such as designating classes of securities, authorizing securities with different voting rights, and the mode of appointing directors. Two broad fiduciary duties offer an ex-45 These codes do not intend to enshrine absolute principles and norms, but merely offer a recommendation. In this respect, they serve several functions: (1) they provide business participants with recommended solutions to compliment corporate law rules and securities regulations; (2) they provide focal point solutions to corporate governance problems; and (3) they are meant to assist business parties in the interpretation and implementation of good governance practices. Paul Coombes and Simon. Relationships between shareholders and management are primarily governed by the articles of association and the law of European civil law countries. In contrast to Delaware General Corporation Law, these corporate laws are more mandatory in nature in that parties have no option but to conform to the corporate law rules. 51 The involvement of the European legislature in developing a harmonization program designed to create a degree of uniformity in the law regarding creditor and investor protection through the EU has arguably tended to restrict flexibility in corporation law in general.
52 Incorporation formalities and capital requirements abound in order to protect shareholders and creditors. Furthermore, firms are required to disclose deviations from default rules, including capital structure, objectives, the system of voting, supervision, and conduct governing general shareholder meetings, in filed articles of incorporation.
In 2002, the U.S. adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposed new independence obligations and restrictions on directors and required internal control mechanisms to restore investor confidence. 54 Upon adopting the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S. corporate law became more mandatory in nature, giving listed U.S. firms less room to maneuver around existing corporate law rules. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION:
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE Sarbanes-Oxley strongly influenced the development of corporate governance in European and Asian-Pacific markets, leading to the emergence of corporate governance codes. 6 Contrary to the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, these codes allegedly offered greater flexibility by following the comply-or-explain rule. Firms should adopt and comply with the boilerplate and standardized provisions of the codes or explain non-compliance. Thus, comply-or-explain gives companies the necessary room to maneuver. It also provides policymakers with more leeway when adjusting codes to meet changing social and economic circumstances. This view is supported by the fact that the drafters of corporate governance codes have been actively introducing, revising and updating these codes since the accounting scandals at the beginning of the century (see Figure 1) . 
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Even though there is wide consensus among European policymakers that the flexibility of codes prevails over inflexible, hard law rules and regulations, 57 firms tend to adopt and comply with the boilerplate and standardized provisions of the codes rather than explain-even though more optimal-non-compliance. In fact, since the principle-based best practices framework tends to be overly detailed and complex, 59 companies often find it difficult to deviate from the codes. 60 It is therefore fair to say that the comply-or-explain approach has encouraged companies to abide by the "letter" of the code, emphasizing the mandatory nature of corporate law in Europe.
It is only to be expected that the recent global financial crisis will lead to more mandatory rules and convergence in the corporate governance systems around the globe. Policymakers and lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic are starting to focus once again on tightening corporate law rules and enacting best-practice provisions to protect investors and creditors. Similar to previous financial crises, visible market failures and perceived corruption sparked public outrage that has forced the hand of legislators in the United States and the European Union. 6 We can distinguish five emerging regulatory responses. First, the crisis gave new life to some old debates on the internal governance of listed firms, primarily on the topic of heightened board independence. The independence of prospective candidates to the board is traditionally determined by reference to a ready-made checklist S9 Principle-based codes emphasize the need to foster standardization and awareness. The drafting committees of the corporate governance codes consist mainly of experienced individuals (making best practice principles more accessible to customization). Yet, experts cannot always be viewed as disinterested persons. They may have political or other agendas, only tangentially related to encouraging business growth and innovation. 
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included in the bylaws or in codes of good practice, without any real scrutiny about other critical qualities such as experience, knowledge, and diligence. The shortcomings of these checklists have in the past facilitated the appointment of directors who were only ostensibly independent. 62 Presently, policy makers are in the process of designing better bright-line rules, which should ideally ensure the independence of prospective candidates to the board, as well as their commitment and expertise. 63 The second item on the law reform agenda is executive compensation. There are a number of general principles that lawmakers have used to draft proposals to mitigate excessive compensation and curtail the opportunistic behavior of managers: (1) compensation should be based on measurable performance objectives, and (2) the decision-making process regarding compensation schemes should be more transparent (see Table 2 ). The latter principle has led U.S. lawmakers to consider measures to increase the involvement of shareholders and even workers in determining executive compensation, the so-called "say-on-pay" provision. After much deliberation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decided on January 25, 2011 to give shareholders the right to participate in the process of setting the compensation levels of management.6 The say-on-pay approach has its roots in Europe, where a number of reforms in this 62 Listed companies in Japan are not obligated to appoint independent directors. Generally, Japanese firms believe there is no place for outsiders in supervising a domestic company. The evidence provided by the sparse examples of outside directors in Japan is inconclusive regarding a possible correlation between independence and firm performance and value. In Seiko, the influence of an outside director proved decisive in solving a timeconsuming and costly conflict in the boardroom. Fujitsu shareholders have a different story. Independent' directors were unable to stop a conflict between board members that seriously affected Fujitsu's share price. Jonathan Soble, field were already introduced in response to the corporate governance scandals of the beginning of this century. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the shareholders of listed firms have an advisory vote on the remuneration report issued by the company. 65 In the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, it is required to obtain a binding shareholder approval for the executive remuneration policy. 66 Jurisdictions are also increasingly inclined to mandate compensation committees to review executive compensation separate from and in addition to audit committees and nominating committees that also have power over aspects of executive oversight. Even if these proposed compensation rules follow global trends, they might not provide a definitive solution to the problems caused by excessive pay of executives in underperforming firms. The proposed rules could prove impractical by protracting and complicating the decision-making process with listed firms. For example, it may be difficult for shareholders to respond to proposed salaries with informed eventually leads to higher pay levels in Japan, which have traditionally been lower than the executive salaries in the United States and Europe, but have already more than doubled over the last ten years. 70 In 2009, less than 300 executives of 3,813 companies listed at Japanese stock exchanges had to disclose their salary. 71 The average salary of a CEO in Japan is US$ 580,000. However, the non-Japanese CEOs of Nissan Corp. and Sony Corp. crushed the expectations of observers that their salary would not exceed US and European levels. Both men received 890 million Yen (US$9.8 million) and 816.5 million Yen (US$9 million), respectively, which is considerably higher than the average CEO pay of US$ 3.5 million at listed companies in the United States. 72 The expectation is that the gap between the salary levels of non-Japanese and Japanese executives will disappear with the new 68 Michiyo Nakamoto, Japan Turns Spotlight on Executive Pay, FIN.
TIMES (June 10, 2010, 19:29), http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial Times" for "Japan Turns Spotlight on Executive Pay Nakamoto").
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As previously mentioned, some EU Member States have also focused on a third trend: encouraging shareholders to be more responsible and active in preventing misbehavior and excessive risktaking by the firm's insiders. The best example of this approach is the U.K.'s Stewardship Code prepared by the Financial Reporting Council in July 2010,7s which contains recommendations to help institutional investors better exercise their rights as shareholders of listed firms. This Code appears to be contributing to efforts to rebuild trust in the financial sector in light of the fact that sixty-eight institutions have already published statements of support less than six months after its publication. However, it seems too early to predict with certainty whether the adherence to this code will encourage long-term growth. The question arises, for instance, whether institutional investors should be actively engaged with investee companies if they lack the time, knowledge, and a financial incentive to do so. 78 Further complicating 73 Executive compensation levels of Japanese executives are viewed as a historical and cultural legacy of Japanese corporations. In Japan, salary was generally viewed as a cost compensation mechanism and not as a performance driver. 76 These principles can be described as follows: (1) Institutional investors are prompted to disclose their engagement policy regarding monitoring, intervening, and voting; (2) a conflict of interest policy is available; (3) institutional investors actively monitor investee companies (e.g., they attend shareholder meetings); (4) institutional investors have an escalation procedure that sets out the circumstances under which they actively intervene in a listed company; (5) if necessary institutional investors act in concert; (6) a policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity is available; and (7) a periodical report informs the market of the stewardship activities, such as voting. 
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matters is the fact that institutional investors owe a fiduciary duty to their own investors which may conflict with corporate governance policies of the investee companies.
A fourth fashionable topic doing the rounds in corporate governance circles is gender parity in the boardroom. Traditionally, women have been underrepresented in the higher managerial echelons of listed firms. A recent report found that amongst Fortune 500 firms only 15.2 percent of all directors are women. 7 9 The situation in the European Union and elsewhere is similar.
8 0 Policymakers across the globe have taken notice and are now attempting to close the boardroom gender gap. Gender parity initiatives are already in effect in Australia, France, Norway, and Spain with different degrees of success. An initial examination of the relationship between board composition and firm performance shows that diverse boards enhance firm performance. Furthermore, gender diversification positively affects corporate social responsibility ratings, which in turn improves the reputation of a company.
82 Some authors have argued, however, that board diversity may restrict the ability of firms to adapt to changing business circumstances. In sum, the research conducted so far does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question of whether gender and ethnic diversity has a positive, neutral, or negative impact on firm performance.84 Before measures mandating board diversity are shareholder investment in U.K. corporate governance." Brian R. Finally, the fifth trend followed by policymakers and lawmakers requires training and coaching for executive and non-executive board members. Even though these soft techniques may sometimes prove effective deterrents for some high-risk strategies pursued by certain executives, they are unlikely, in the long run, to form the basis of a coherent and effective corporate governance regime that provide executives and managers with sufficient incentives while protecting the interests of passive investors and other stakeholders.
In the next section, we will show that extended and detailed corporate governance rules and regulations, which are based on a onesize-fits-all approach and encourage box-ticking, may actually lead to higher net costs for companies and their stakeholders. We will challenge the one-size-fits-all mentality of policyrnakers by describing three exemplars illustrating the negative effects of more detailed measures, and argue that the effect of corporate governance rules on listed companies should be further examined before engaging policymakers and lawmakers to implement inappropriate measures too forcibly and hastily.
III. THE CASE AGAINST ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE RULES
A. EXEMPLAR 1: HIGH GROWTH COMPANIES
The first exemplar frames our view that the strengthening of corporate governance rules, which is high on Europe's political agenda, 87 This is important, especially in dealing with the lingering consequences of the economic downturn as listed high growth companies contribute disproportionately to the creation of jobs and wealth. In this respect, it is interesting to see that when we compare the ranking of the world's largest companies in the Financial Times Global 500 list (see Figure  2) ,89 the number of relatively young listed high-growth companies in the United States is remarkable, (2) U.S. high-growth companies dominate the top 100 of the ranking, and (3) starting (or moving) a high-growth company into the United States seems to increase the chances of success.
90 Table 3 -and-its-3-d-printing-comes-to-new-york/?ref-technology. This is also exemplified by the recent move of Shapeways, which is a spin-off company of Royal Philips Electronics in the Netherlands, to New York. After Shapeways secured a $5 million investment from Union Square Ventures, a New York Venture Capital Fund, and London-based Index Ventures, the highgrowth company reincorporated as a Delaware corporation in the United States. Besides business considerations, the flexibility and stability in corporate governance also played a role in making the reincorporation decision. One might wonder why Europe is lagging behind in terms of the creation of listed high-growth companies. The answer is of course not straightforward and depends on factors such as the access to capital, the entrepreneurial mindset, the existence of networks and relationships, and the experience of intermediaries.
91 Yet, the availability of the Delaware corporate form that combines strong management and control characteristics with contractual flexibility also plays a pivotal role in the emergence of listed high-growth companies. 92 The flexibility and 2010) . 92 The National Venture Capital Association has posted model legal documents on its website. The model certificate of incorporation is set up for a company incorporated in Delaware. Delaware corporate law is preferred for four reasons: (1) it offers a modem and internationally recognized statute, (2) it offers a well-developed body of case law, (3) the Delaware Court of Chancery's understanding of running a business, and (4) 
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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE stability of the Delaware General Corporation Law allows managersoften the entrepreneurial founders-and shareholders to set up an organizational structure that best meets their special business needs as a growth company. Figure 3) . Yet, despite some antipathy to corporate governance rules and regulations, business leaders in the United States have started to accept the Sarbanes-Oxley measures as an obligatory set of minimum standards necessary to warrant business success and revenues on a global scale. Firms are increasingly convinced that improving board structures, financial transparency, and disclosure policies is imperative to attract prospective investors. This conclusion is drawn from interviews conducted with lawyers, business leaders, and other insiders familiar with the compliance trends associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The growing number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of companies in the United States in 2010 seems to confirm this view.
97
96 Confidentiality and anonymity arrangements prevent us to mention the names of the interviewees. Relevant records are on file with the authors. The U.S. approach to corporate governance primarily seeks to ensure that companies disclose their organizational structure and financial conditions to investors. With some exceptions, no substantive and costly corporate governance requirements are imposed on listed companies. We argue that flexible corporate law and governance principles that create a low access level to financial markets are more successful for high-growth companies in the long run. Certainly, at a time of corporate scandals and economic stagnation, it is hard to make the case that companies in jurisdictions with a flexible corporate governance structure eventually outperform companies in countries with strict and rigid corporate governance rules and regulations. Most commentators explain that if Europe were to replicate the entrepreneurial environment of the United States, it should give priority to establishing high labor mobility and risk tolerance, a well-developed stock market, and large, independent sources of venture-capital funding.
10 5 However, despite these arguments, the Google exemplar seems to indicate that flexible and adaptable corporate governance frameworks also play an important role in the development of highgrowth companies in Europe. 06 Certainly, the exemplar suggests that 
B. EXEMPLAR 2: THE CASE FOR "RESPONSIBLE" SHAREHOLDERS
The past few years have seen an exponential increase in the rights of shareholders in listed firms.' 08 One of the goals underlying these changes is the idea that investors can be nudged into exercising their corporate rights in order to counteract opportunism by insiders. However, reforms undertaken in several jurisdictions have seemingly failed to encourage a more hands-on approach by shareholders. This failure is particularly worrisome in light of the increased operational costs that enhanced investor rights generate for listed firms. The efforts of policymakers to encourage "responsible behavior" by shareholders may actually lead to adverse economic consequences.
Evidence gathered from participation in shareholder meetings shows that investors are still reluctant to actively exercise their improved rights. The general assembly of shareholders, which allows shareholders to submit proposals and vote on the items included in the agenda, is perhaps the most important mechanism through which investors can make their voices heard. Despite the importance of general assemblies for governance, policymakers have long struggled to stimulate more active attendance and participation in these meetings.' 0 9 Our research indicates these efforts have not had the coveted effect of significantly increasing attendance at these shareholders meetings. To test whether improvements in the rights of that need to circumvent the strict regulations. For instance, Mensch und Machine Software SE, a high-tech company that focuses on Computer Aided Design and Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) solutions employed the SE to implement a one-tier board structure. This provided the founders with more control and influence of the decision-making processes (compare the earlier Google example).
107 Cf Guide to Starting a Corporation, Fenwick & West LLP (2009) (stating that listed companies prefer Delaware General Corporation Law for its flexibility and prestige).
los See supra Section III.B.
